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Resource accounting in measures of unsustainability: 
Challenging the World Bank’s conclusions 
Abstract 
The World Bank has recently published a comprehensive study of environ-
mental and resource accounting, covering 103 countries (World Bank 1997a). 
The study concludes that many Sub-Saharan, Northern African and Middle East 
countries have had negative ‘genuine’ saving rates over the last 20 years and 
therefore fail to pass the test of weak sustainability. This paper argues that the 
Bank’s conclusions depend on a method for computing user costs from resource 
exploitation that is challenged by two competing ones (the ‘El Serafy’-method 
and the method of Repetto et al.) and is inferior to one of its rivals. Resource 
rents are re-computed using the ‘El Serafy’-method for 14 countries and the 
Sub-Saharan and Northern African and Middle East regions. The results are 
that both regions and almost all countries either stop exhibiting signs of unsus-
tainability or their unsustainability can be explained without having recourse to 
resource accounting. However, for Congo, Ecuador, Gabon, Nigeria, Maurita-
nia and Trinidad and Tobago there is a lesson: These countries did not ade-
quately use the opportunities they were given through their natural resource 
endowments and should learn from their mistake for the future depletion of 
their remaining reserves of natural resources. 
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1. Introduction 
 
If sustainability is defined as the capacity to provide non-declining future wel-
fare then, clearly, a reliable measure of sustainability would be of great policy 
usefulness. In recent years, several studies have been undertaken claiming to 
provide an admittedly crude measure of weak sustainability for single countries 
or a selection of countries — e.g. Repetto et al. (1989) for Indonesia, Repetto and 
Cruz (1991) for Costa Rica, van Tongeren et al. (1993) for Mexico, Bartelmus et 
al. (1993) for Papua New Guinea, Serôa da Motta and Young (1995) for Brazil, 
and Pearce and Atkinson (1993), and Hamilton and Atkinson (1996) for several 
countries. The term ‘weak’ refers to the fact that, often implicitly, perfect substi-
tutability between man-made, natural and other forms of capital is assumed in 
both production and utility functions. 
World Bank (1997a) is the most comprehensive of these studies, covering 103 
countries in total over a period of 25 years. It suggests that the world taken to-
gether as well as the high-income countries are safely weak sustainable due to 
high investments in man-made and human capital. It also suggests that most 
Sub-Saharan countries and the whole region show signs of unsustainability dur-
ing the 1980s and 1990s. The same is true for some North African and Middle 
East countries and the region as a whole who fail to pass the test of weak sus-
tainability from the early 1970s onwards. 
This paper critically examines the World Bank (1997a) study. It shows that 
the Bank’s rather strong conclusions crucially depend on a method for comput-
ing resource rents that is one of at least three competing ones and is inferior to 
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one of its rivals. Using the so-called ‘El Serafy’-method to compute resource 
rents leads to opposite conclusions for both regions and indeed for most coun-
tries that fail to pass the test of weak sustainability according to World Bank 
(1997a). Thus it is demonstrated that the study does not provide a reliable sus-
tainability indicator and will lead to wrong policy conclusions. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the structure of the 
data and the main conclusions of World Bank (1997a). It also states the welfare 
theoretic foundations for the Bank’s ‘genuine savings’ indicator of unsustain-
ability. Section 3 discusses competing methods for computing resource rents 
and argues why using the ‘El Serafy’-method is preferable to the Bank’s 
method. Section 4 undertakes empirical sensitivity analysis in computing re-
source rents according to the ‘El Serafy’-method in the calculation of genuine 
savings for those countries that appeared to be unsustainable according to 
World Bank (1997a). It shows that the Bank’s conclusions are largely reversed if 
this competing method is used. Nevertheless, a few countries keep on exhibit-
ing signs of unsustainability. For these countries in particular section 5 dis-
cusses policy implications. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. The World Bank study 
 
The data set underlying World Bank (1997a) consists of savings and accompa-
nying data (World Bank 1997b). Of special interest here is what the Bank calls 
„Extended Genuine Saving II“ (EGS II): gross saving as conventionally defined 
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in the system of national accounts plus education expenditures minus deprecia-
tion of man-made capital minus resource rents from the depletion of natural 
resources minus damage caused by CO2-emissions as a proxy for other pollut-
ants.1 Current educational spending (e.g. teachers’ salaries, expenditures on 
textbooks) is considered as an investment in human capital, rather than con-
sumption as in the traditional national accounts. The difference is relevant, 
since current expenditures make up more than 90% of all educational expendi-
tures (World Bank 1997a, p. 34). For the computation of natural resource rents 
Word Bank (1997a) includes the following items: oil, natural gas, hard coal, 
brown coal, bauxite, copper, iron, lead, nickel, zinc, phosphate, tin, gold, silver 
and forests. Rents are usually computed as price minus average costs times 
production/harvest, i.e. they are valued at so-called total Hotelling-rent where 
the more readily available average costs are used as a proxy for the theoretically 
correct marginal costs. The only pollutant considered are CO2-emissions which 
are valued at 20 US$ per metric tonne of carbon. The value is taken from Fank-
hauser (1995) and is often regarded as a consensus estimate.2 
Of all the data underlying World Bank (1997a) EGS II is closest to a broad 
measure of weak sustainability. This result can be derived from dynamic opti-
misation models as, e.g., in Hamilton (1994, 1996) and Neumayer (1999). While 
Asheim (1994) and Pezzey and Withagen (1995) have shown that positive genu-
ine saving rates are only a necessary, but not sufficient condition for weak sus-
tainability, „persistently negative rates of genuine saving must lead, eventually, 
to declining well-being“ (World Bank 1997a, p. 28). 
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Note that because of the underlying optimisation framework efficient re-
source pricing according to the Hotelling (1931) rule is implicitly assumed: re-
source rent rises over time at the rate of interest. This leads to some modifica-
tions for the ‘keep genuine savings above zero’ rule for an open economy 
(Hartwick 1996, Asheim 1996). With marginal extraction costs not falling at a 
rate higher than the interest rate, future resource prices will be higher than cur-
rent ones, thus providing the resource exporter with improving terms-of-trade. 
Due to that, the exporter of natural non-renewable resources can have negative 
genuine savings and still ensure sustainability. The resource importer, on the 
other hand, faces a future deterioration in her terms-of-trade, so she must save 
more than would be the case in a closed economy. That is, it is on the non-
renewable resource importer to make an extra-adjustment for the growing scar-
city of the resource. 
In World Bank (1997a) no correction term for anticipated price changes is in-
cluded on either the resource exporter’s or importer’s side, however. The rea-
son is presumably that the authors consider empirical support for efficient re-
source pricing to be rather weak and are unsure about the future development 
of actual net resource prices, so that „as a default ‘rule of thumb’ for sustainabil-
ity, simply investing current resource rents is likely to be the prudent course of 
action“ (Hamilton and Atkinson 1996, p. 4) for both importers and exporters.3 
This disregarding of future price changes is problematic because it contradicts 
the underlying dynamic optimisation assumptions which were necessary to 
provide the sustainability foundations of genuine savings in the first place. 
 5 
World Bank (1997a) assigns all damage from CO2 to the emitting country. 
This allocation rule is not compelling. Damage from global warming is caused 
by the accumulated stock of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. Developing coun-
tries could make a point in claiming that their incremental CO2-emissions 
should count less than those from developed countries considering the already 
existing stock of CO2 in the atmosphere mainly due to developed country emis-
sions. A closer inspection of the data in World Bank (1997b) reveals, however, 
that damage from CO2-emissions plays a negligible role in bringing EGS II 
rates4 down below zero. I therefore do not undertake sensitivity analyses for 
damage from CO2-emissions. 
The years covered in World Bank (1997a) are 1970 to 1994, for some coun-
tries only up to 1993. The data set includes 103 countries, which are grouped 
into income and regional groups (see World Bank 1997b). None of the former or 
current communist countries is included, for lack of data with acceptable qual-
ity. Some of the very small countries are missing as well. Appendix 1 indicates 
which countries had certain ranges of years with negative EGS II rates. 
Figure 1 shows EGS II rates for four different income groups and the world 
taken together.5 Keeping in mind that „where genuine saving is negative, it is a 
clear indicator of unsustainability“ (World Bank 1995, p. 53), it is apparent that 
for the world taken together and the high income countries in particular there is 
no indication of unsustainability. All of the other three income groups experi-
ence a few years with negative rates, most notably the group of lower middle 
income countries. The rates are only slightly negative, however, and they are 
not persistent in the sense that they become positive again in the early and mid-
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1980s and reach their former level in the early 1990s. It can be concluded there-
fore that at this level of aggregation no clear signs of unsustainability are ap-
parent. 
 
 
Figure 2 shows EGS II rates for a selection of five different regions. The 
highest rates are achieved in East Asia where they usually fluctuate between 
10% and 20%. South Asia’s EGS II rates are relatively constant around 6-7 % 
and never go negative. For the Caribbean and Latin America the rates decline 
from 10% in the late 1970s to just below 0% in 1985 from where they have risen 
again to just over 5% in 1993. More problematic is the region of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Its EGS II-rate declined from around 5% in the late 1970s to become 
negative in 1979, slightly positive in 1980 and turned negative again afterwards 
where it has stayed for the rest of the period, fluctuating around -5%. Still more 
problematic is the region of North Africa and Middle East. This region experi-
enced positive rates only in 1972, 1973 and 1987. During the late 1970s and early 
1980s it exhibited rates drastically lower than -10%, reaching its climax in 1979 
with almost -30%! If persistent EGS II rates are a clear indicator of unsustain-
ability, then Africa and the Middle East appear to be on an unsustainable path. 
 
Source: Own computations from World Bank (1997b). 
Figure 1. Extended Genuine Saving II rates for income groups. 
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To analyse what drives EGS II rates to become negative it is best to disag-
gregate the data still further and look at individual country experiences. I de-
cided, somewhat arbitrarily, to translate „persistently negative rates“ into „hav-
ing experienced negative rates for more than 10 years in the period 1970-1994“ 
though not necessarily in a row. 24 out of the total of 103 countries were unsus-
tainable thus defined. 
For 5 out of these 24 countries — Chad, Madagascar, Malawi, Sierra Leone 
and Uganda — the EGS II rates are very close to and move very closely with the 
Extended Net Saving (ENetS) rates, where ENetS is defined as gross saving 
from the traditional system of national accounts minus depreciation of man-
made capital plus education expenditures. For these countries, therefore, unsus-
tainability can already be explained without having recourse to taking natural 
capital into account: they are on an unsustainable path because they eat up their 
stock of man-made capital. Even taking ENetS as an indicator would detect 
these countries as unsustainable and looking at EGS II instead would not give 
major new insights. These countries are therefore excluded from the further 
analysis. 
 
 
3. Competing methods for computing resource rents 
 
Source: Own computations from World Bank (1997b). 
Figure 2. Extended Genuine Saving II rates for regions. 
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Of particular interest is what drives the EGS II rates below ENetS rates for the 
other countries. Since ENetS minus rents from natural resource depletion minus 
(negligible) damage from CO2-emissions equals EGS II, we have to examine in 
more detail how the numbers for resource rents are generated. 
The Bank values resource rents to be deducted from ENetS as 
 
(1)  ( )P AC R− ⋅  
 
where P is the resource price, AC is average cost and R is resource depletion. 
Note that (1) roughly corresponds to total Hotelling rent, except that the more 
readily available average costs are used instead of marginal costs. 
Resource discoveries do not enter the formula. The Bank values discoveries 
at average discovery costs which are used as a more readily available proxy for 
marginal costs. Since „exploration expenditures are treated as investment in 
standard national accounting“ (World Bank 1997a, p. 28) already anyway, there 
is no correction term for discoveries. 
The Bank’s method to compute resource rents is just one of at least three. 
The others I look at here are the so-called ‘El Serafy’-method (El Serafy 1989, 
1991) and the method of Repetto et al. (Repetto et al. 1989, Repetto and Cruz 
1991). The formula for the method of Repetto et al. is: 
 
  ( ) ( )P AC R D− ⋅ −  
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where D is resource discoveries. Note that in this method resource discoveries 
are valued at P-AC, i.e. at net profits and that the correction term can be posi-
tive if D > R in the accounting period. Efficient resource pricing according to 
Hotelling’s rule is implicitly assumed. Also note that, strictly speaking, explora-
tion expenditures should be netted out from NNP, if this method is used, in 
order to avoid partial double counting of resource discoveries. 
The formula for the ‘El Serafy’-method is: 
 
 (2) ( )
( )
P AC R
r n
− ⋅ ⋅
+





+
1
1 1
 
 
where r is the discount rate and n is the number of remaining years of the re-
source stock if production was the same in the future as in the base year, i.e. n is 
the static reserves to production ratio. If r > 0 and n > 0, then (2) will produce a 
smaller deduction term for resource depletion than (1). 
(2) is also called the ‘user cost’ of resource depletion since it indicates the 
share of resource receipts that should be considered as capital depreciation. 
Note that no explicit correction term for resource discoveries is needed in this 
method since discoveries enter the formula via changing n and the formula is 
computed anew for each year. 
The formula for the ‘El Serafy’-method is derived from the following reason-
ing: receipts from non-renewable resource extraction should not fully count as 
‘sustainable income’ because resource extraction leads to a lowering of the re-
source stock and thus brings with it an element of depreciation of the resource 
 10 
capital stock.6 While the receipts from the resource stock will end at some finite 
time, ‘sustainable income’ by definition must last forever. Hence, ‘sustainable 
income’ is that part of resource receipts which if received infinitely would have 
a present value just equal to the present value of the finite stream of resource 
receipts over the life-time of the resource. 
Defining resource receipts RC as RC P AC R≡ − ⋅( ) , then the present value of 
resource receipts RC at the constant discount rate r over the expected life-time n 
of the resource stock is equal to: 
 
(3)  
RC
r
RC
r
r
i
i
n n
( )
( )
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
+
∑ =
−
+






−
+
=
+
 
 
The present value of an infinite stream of ‘sustainable income’ SI is 
 
(4)  
SI
r
SI r
r
SI
r
i
i ( )
( )
1
1
1
1
1
0 +
∑ =
+
=
−
+
=
∞
 
 
Setting (3) and (4) equal and rearranging expresses SI as a fraction of RC:7 
 
(5)  SI RC
r n
= −
+





+1
1
1 1( )
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The correction term, representing user cost or the depreciation of the re-
source stock, would thus be 
 
  ( )
( )
( )
( )
RC SI RC
r
P AC R
rn n
− =
+





 = − ⋅
+





+ +
1
1
1
11 1
 
 
which is the formula in (2). An estimate of the life-time of the resource, n, that is 
the static reserves to production ratio is required. The ‘El Serafy’-method does 
not presume efficient resource pricing — resource rent growing at the rate of 
interest according to Hotelling’s rule —, because it is not dependent on an op-
timisation model. It is an „ex post approach, capable of accounting for any en-
trepreneurial decisions regarding extraction“ (El Serafy 1997, p. 222). As a con-
sequence future resource receipts have to be discounted and the ‘El Serafy’-
method requires the selection of a discount rate r. If either the life-time of the 
resource asset, n, or the discount rate r are quite large, the necessary correction 
term will consequently be rather small (see equation (2)). Also note that the cor-
rection term can never be positive. 
Which method for computing natural resource rents should be preferred? 
Both the World Bank’s method and the method of Repetto et al. can be derived 
from a dynamic optimisation model. The difference is that to arrive at the 
World Bank’s method expenditures for resource exploration are modelled as 
depending on the stock of cumulated discoveries, whereas the method of Re-
petto et al. can be derived from a model where these expenditures are a func-
tion of the total stock of resources. Hamilton (1995, p. 64) shows that modelling 
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discovery expenditures being dependent on the resource stock leads to higher 
genuine savings than if expenditures depend on the stock of cumulated discov-
eries. 
In comparison, the method of Repetto et al. seems to lack direct intuitive ap-
peal. Whereas there does not seem to exist a good reason for assuming that ex-
ploration costs depend on the total stock of a resource, it makes much sense to 
assume that resource exploration costs depend on the stock of past discoveries 
as the World Bank’s method does. This is because later discoveries should be 
more expensive than earlier ones if the easy to find reserves are discovered first 
— which we would expect in a dynamic optimisation framework. On the other 
hand, the two methods are obviously linked since resource discoveries both 
increase the stock of past discoveries and the resource stock. Overall I would 
say that on theoretical grounds there are more good reasons in favour of the 
World Bank’s method. 
The ‘El Serafy’-method, on the other hand, can be argued to be superior to 
the Bank’s method. This is for two reasons: one is that it is not derived from a 
dynamic optimisation model. None of the data the Bank uses are guaranteed to 
be the ones that would be generated if a country’s economy developed along 
the optimal path and the Bank does not attempt to estimate any shadow values. 
Actually, since, as mentioned already, the Bank excludes future terms-of-trade 
effects in computing EGS II, it even implicitly excludes efficient resource pric-
ing. Hence, to be consistent, it is better to use a method for computing resource 
rents that does not presume that the underlying data are optimal values either. 
Interestingly, in Atkinson et al. (1997, p. 60f.) the same authors on whose work 
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the World Bank (1997a) study is mainly built upon, admit that since „there is 
little evidence for efficient pricing of resources in the ground“, it „may be ad-
visable to value resource depletion as a user cost with a non-zero discount rate“ 
according to the ‘El Serafy’-method. 
The other reason for preferring the ‘El Serafy’-method is that the Bank’s 
method lacks intuitive appeal if one looks at the EGS II rates it generates for 
certain countries. Take Saudi Arabia as an example: Figure 3 shows the coun-
try’s ENetS rates together with EGS II rates calculated with the Word Bank 
method (EGS II (World Bank)) and EGS II rates calculated with the ‘El Serafy’-
method (EGS II (El Serafy)). EGS II measures increases or decreases in the total 
stock of a nation’s capital. According to EGS II (World Bank) Saudi Arabia has 
had persistent negative rates (usually lower than -20%) for the whole period of 
accounting. This does not make any sense since it would mean that after a few 
years almost all of Saudi-Arabia’s once existing total capital stock would have 
been eaten up and the country’s economy would be doomed to collapse. Why 
did it not collapse? Mainly because part of the resource rent should properly 
count as income and not as capital depreciation and also because during the 
accounting period more oil and natural gas wells were discovered that boosted 
the nation's capital stock. As we will see in the next section, if the ‘El Serafy’-
method is used instead for computing net depreciation of the natural resource 
stock then Saudi-Arabia turns out to exhibit positive EGS II rates: the country’s 
capital stock has increased instead of diminished to negligible quantities as 
suggested by the World Bank’s method. This makes much more intuitive sense 
considering how well off Saudi Arabians are. 
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I do not claim that the ‘El Serafy’-method is without problems. One of its 
shortcomings lies in its assumption about constant resource receipts, which has 
been one of the most frequently raised criticisms against the method (e.g. Hart-
wick and Hageman (1993, p. 222), Aaheim and Nyborg (1995, p. 63), Brekke 
(1997, p. 524)). Note, however, that since World Bank (1997a) assumes constant 
net resource prices as well, part of this criticism is irrelevant for the choice be-
tween the World Bank’s method and the ‘El Serafy’-method. Also, it should be 
kept in mind that any practical method for resource accounting would need to 
assume constant resource receipts. Furthermore, the ‘El Serafy’-method can use 
readily available average costs without apology. The World Bank’s method, on 
the other hand, has to commit the mistake of inconsistency: for practical reasons 
it has to rely on average costs, but this contradicts once more the underlying 
assumption of efficient resource pricing according to the Hotelling rule which is 
defined in marginal cost terms.8 
 
 
4. Computing resource rents according to the ‘El Serafy’-method 
 
In the following sensitivity analysis resource rents have been computed with 
the ‘El Serafy’-method instead of the Bank’s method for the countries that have 
Source: Own computations from World Bank (1997b) and sources indicated in appendix 2. 
Figure 3. Sensitivity analysis for resource rents of Saudi Arabia. 
 15 
been classified as unsustainable. Which resources do we need to look at for this 
analysis? Table I provides the answer. It shows that for Algeria, Bolivia, Congo, 
Ecuador, Gabon, Iran, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Vene-
zuela the dominating force is oil and natural gas. Their share is always more 
than 90% with the exception of Bolivia for which tin is also important. For 
Papua New Guinea the dominating resources are copper and gold, for Zambia 
it is copper, for Jamaica it is bauxite, for Mauritania iron ore. For Nepal, Haiti, 
and Ghana forestry represents a major share of resource rents. For Ghana it is 
also gold. For the more important countries it is clearly rents from oil and natu-
ral gas that dominate. 
 
 
The following sensitivity analysis covers oil, natural gas, bauxite, copper, 
gold, iron ore and tin. Appendix 2 describes the sources of data for computing 
user costs according to the ‘El Serafy’-method. Forestry was excluded due to the 
many difficulties in getting reliable data. It follows that no sensitivity analysis 
could be undertaken for Nepal and Haiti and for parts of Ghana’s resource 
rents. A relatively low discount rate of 4% p.a. was applied following the rate 
which World Bank (1997a) uses for wealth estimations. 
The sensitivity analysis reveals a number of things: 
 
Source: Own computations from World Bank (1997b). 
Table I. Share of single natural resources of total resource rents. 
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1) Those countries with huge reserves of resources relative to their production 
and positive ENetS rates throughout stop having negative EGS II rates (El 
Serafy) altogether or have only one year with a negative rate. This applies to 
Algeria, Iran, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. (As an ex-
ample refer back to figure 3 for Saudi Arabia.) This was to be expected since 
high reserves to production ratios (a high n in equation (2)) depress the user 
costs of resource depletion. This is because, for a given resource production, 
a smaller share of the total resource stock is used up. 
 
2) The unsustainability of some countries with temporary negative ENetS rates 
can be explained without taking recourse to EGS II rates. This applies to Bo-
livia and Jamaica, which for every year of negative EGS II rates (El Serafy) 
have negative ENetS rates as well. It also applies to Ghana which has only 
one year (1987) of both a positive ENetS-rate and a marginally negative 
EGS II-rate (El Serafy). For Zambia EGS II rates (El Serafy) are rather close to 
and move rather close with ENetS rates as well. Zambia has six years of 
slightly positive ENetS rates and slightly negative EGS II rates (El Serafy), 
however. 
 
3) Remain the cases of Congo, Ecuador, Gabon, Nigeria, Mauritania, and Trini-
dad and Tobago. These countries share a similar experience: although EGS II 
rates (El Serafy) are considerably higher than EGS II rates (World Bank), in a 
number of years EGS II rates (El Serafy) are negative while ENetS rates are 
still positive. For Congo this is true for four years, for Ecuador for seven 
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years, for Gabon for four years, for Nigeria for six years, for Mauritania for 
three years and for Trinidad and Tobago for seven years. The reasons for 
this divergence are similar for these countries: they all have relatively low oil 
reserves to production ratios, with the exception of Mauritania which pro-
duces iron ore.9 In addition, usually in the 1980s their production increased, 
while their reserves either remained constant or even declined which further 
depressed their reserves to production ratio. Because of that the user costs 
from oil depletion calculated via the ‘El Serafy’-method are high (although 
not as high as according to the Bank’s method, of course). Interestingly, all 
these countries with the exception of Gabon exhibit high reserves to produc-
tion ratios for natural gas over the period 1970-1994, i.e. their natural gas re-
serves have not been significantly exploited so far.10 This can provide some 
hints as to how past mistakes can be avoided in the future as will be argued 
in the next section. Before doing so let us ask first, however, whether we can 
conclude that for these six countries the failure of passing the test of weak 
sustainability can be reliably detected only with EGS II rates (El Serafy), 
whereas their ENetS rates would misleadingly suggest that these countries 
are weakly sustainable. 
The answer is no, at least not in general. This is because in computing 
EGS II rates (El Serafy) a rather low rate of discount (4% p.a.) was deliber-
ately chosen so as to provide a conservative estimate of the divergence from 
the EGS II rates (World Bank). Usually, real rates of return, especially in de-
veloping countries are much higher than 4% p.a. For further analysis I have 
therefore analysed the effects of choosing a discount rate of 10% p.a. Look-
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ing back at equation (2) reveals that a high discount rate (r) depresses user 
costs. This is because a smaller share of resource receipts has to be invested 
in an alternative asset in order to provide a sustainable alternative income 
stream if the rate of return on this investment is higher. 
For Congo and Nigeria the EGS II rates (El Serafy) move so close with the 
ENetS rates if a discount rate of 10% p.a. is used that hardly any additional 
information is revealed by looking at EGS II (El Serafy 10% p.a.) rather than 
ENetS. Gabon stops exhibiting any signs of unsustainability if EGS II (El Ser-
afy) is calculated with the higher discount rate. The same is true for Mauri-
tania except for one year in which her ENetS-rate is also negative. For the 
two remaining countries the picture is less clear-cut. Ecuador has only two 
years with negative ENetS rates, but still six years of negative EGS II rates 
(El Serafy 10% p.a.) — see figure 4 below. The gap between EGS II rates (El 
Serafy 10% p.a.) and EGS II rates (World Bank) is quite large (up to about 20 
percentage points in 1984), but it is not always enough to bridge the gap be-
tween ENetS rates and EGS II rates (El Serafy 10% p.a.). The same is basi-
cally true for Trinidad and Tobago which has four negative EGS II rates (El 
Serafy 10% p.a.), but only two negative ENetS rates. Especially for these two 
countries a lesson can be learned from their gap between ENetS and EGS II 
(El Serafy), whether calculated at 4% p.a. or 10% p.a., and it is this the next 
section focuses on. 
 
Source: Own computations from World Bank (1997b) and sources indicated in appendix 2. 
Figure 4. Further sensitivity analysis for Ecuador. 
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5. Policy implications 
 
The divergence between ENetS rates and the EGS II rates (El Serafy), that is de-
tectable even with a discount rate of 10% p.a., can provide some hints for better 
future resource management. What the divergence suggests is that these coun-
tries in the past did not adequately use the opportunities they were given 
through their oil endowment, or in the case of Mauritania iron ore endowment, 
to build up and maintain man-made and human capital in exchange for re-
source depletion. They should learn from their mistake for the future depletion 
of their as yet hardly exploited natural gas reserves or, in the case of Maurita-
nia, the still considerable iron ore reserves. 11 
This is one of the rare points where this paper’s analysis is in harmony with 
the basic reasoning in the World Bank’s conclusions: „The depressed rates of 
genuine saving (...) represent an opportunity not seized. (...) [I]t is often the 
gross saving effort that is insufficient in these countries, which points the finger 
squarely at broader macroeconomic policies.“ (World Bank 1997a, p. 35). The 
fundamental message of this conclusion is not confined to Congo, Ecuador, Ga-
bon, Nigeria, Mauritania, and Trinidad and Tobago, however. Even for coun-
tries with very high reserves to production ratios and hence no indication of a 
failure to pass the test of weak sustainability, a large divergence between ENetS 
rates and EGS II rates (El Serafy) suggests „that due prudence is not being fol-
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lowed — that some amount of the national [natural resource, E.N.] wealth is 
simply consumed...“ (World Bank 1997a, p. 35). 
Finally, let us have a look at some aggregate graphs. Figure 5 compares 
EGS II rates (World Bank) for Sub-Saharan Africa and for North Africa and 
Middle East to their EGS II rates (El Serafy) with a discount rate of 4% p.a. 
Whereas Sub-Saharan Africa has 14 years of negative EGS II rates following the 
World Bank method, there are only four years with slightly negative rates if 
resource rents are computed with the ‘El Serafy’-method. The latter paints a 
picture of much less gloom for the region.12 
 
 
The reversal in conclusion about the sustainability performance of a region 
is even drastically stronger in the case of North Africa and Middle East. 
Whereas EGS II rates (World Bank) suggest that this region is clearly unsustain-
able with only three years of positive rates, the graph of EGS II rates (El Serafy) 
paints a completely different picture: North Africa and Middle East never fail to 
pass the test of weak sustainability and, better still, exhibit quite strong EGS II 
rates (El Serafy) that are above 20% in eight years and between 10% and 20% for 
the rest of the period with the exception of one year! The policy conclusions 
from the two methods are completely different: whereas the World Bank 
method suggests that North African and Middle East countries endanger the 
Source: Own computations from World Bank (1997b) and sources indicated in appendix 2. 
Figure 5. Sensitivity analysis for Sub-Saharan Africa, and North Africa and Middle 
East 
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welfare of their future populations, the ‘El Serafy’-method suggests that there is 
no reason to worry about sustainability since enough of the resource rents are 
invested in man-made and human capital to ensure non-declining future wel-
fare. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The World Bank (1997a) study claims that many Sub-Saharan and North Afri-
can and Middle East as well as some countries from other regions have failed to 
pass the test of weak sustainability. This paper has shown in a sensitivity analy-
sis that this conclusion crucially depends on the specific method the World 
Bank uses to compute resource rents. In calculating resource rents with this 
method the Bank applies an inconsistent methodology: on the one hand, its 
method for resource accounting assumes efficient resource pricing as a neces-
sary consequence of the underlying dynamic optimisation framework that pro-
vides the welfare theoretic foundations for genuine savings. On the other hand, 
World Bank (1997a) implicitly rejects efficient resource pricing in ignoring fu-
ture terms-of-trade effects according to the Hotelling (1931) rule. Using Saudi 
Arabia as an example, it was shown that this inconsistency leads to the counter-
factual conclusion that the country has depleted its capital to an extent that its 
inhabitants should be severely impoverished which they are clearly not. 
As an alternative the ‘El Serafy’-method was therefore employed which was 
argued to be superior to the World Bank’s method since it does not depend on 
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efficient resource pricing and leads to intuitively more plausible conclusions. If 
this alternative method is used with a relatively low discount rate of 4% p.a., 
Sub-Saharan Africa does not exhibit persistent negative rates of genuine saving 
anymore and the region of North Africa and Middle East turns out to be a 
strong genuine saver. This finding holds basically true on a disaggregated level 
as well for most countries that were detected by World Bank (1997a) as unsus-
tainable: either they do not fail to pass the test of weak sustainability anymore 
or their unsustainability can be explained with negative extended net saving 
rates alone, i.e. without taking recourse to resource depletion. 
As mentioned already, I do not claim that the ‘El Serafy’-method is perfect. 
In addition to the points discussed already comes the fact that the ‘El Serafy’-
method can produce different figures using different discount rates and it is far 
from clear what the ‘right’ rate is. Another problem is that very often reserve 
data of resources are much less reliable than production data and sometimes 
completely missing. Given the crucial role that n, the static reserves to produc-
tion ratio, plays in calculating user cost, this certainly represents a weakness 
and a lot more effort would be needed to establish reliable and verifiable re-
serve data. Maybe therefore future research can find a better method for com-
puting net depreciation of the natural resource stock. What matters for the 
analysis in this paper is that I have argued that the ‘El Serafy’-method is better 
than the World Bank’s method. Furthermore, even those who would disagree 
with this suggestion, would have to admit that a measure of unsustainability 
cannot be reliable if its main conclusions are reverted by using a competing and 
not obviously inferior method for resource accounting. 
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If the World Bank’s (1997a) results are taken serious as a reliable indicator of 
unsustainability, the Bank itself and other institutions will be tempted to follow 
wrong policy conclusions for the wrong countries. One policy conclusion At-
kinson and Hamilton (1996, p. 4f. and 14) and Atkinson et al. (1997, p. 114) ten-
tatively suggest, is making aid concessional for developing countries who fail to 
pass the test of weak sustainability in order to bring them (back) on a sustain-
able path.13 As this paper has made clear, it is much more difficult to detect 
these countries and the reason for their failure to be sustainable is likely to stem 
from inadequate extended net savings rather than from wasting the receipts 
from resource depletion. 
Many other critical aspects of the World Bank (1997a) study have not been 
scrutinised in this paper. For example, it is debatable whether valuing CO2-
emissions with 20US$ per tonne of carbon is sufficient to account for damage 
caused by greenhouse gases and, particularly, by other pollutants. In doing so, 
more might have been left out than has been included. Also, the coverage of 
renewable resources would need to be extented in order to arrive at a compre-
hensive genuine saving measure. Forests are an important renewable resource, 
but not the only one. If possible, resources like water, soil, fish and, more gen-
erally, biodiversity should be included. On the other hand, World Bank (1997a) 
does not take into account the beneficial effects of future technical progress on 
the capacity of a nation to provide non-declining future welfare. More funda-
mentally, it is highly contested whether reliable measurements of unsustainabil-
ity are possible at all with a genuine savings concept that depends on a dynamic 
optimisation framework when a country’s economy is likely to develop along a 
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non-optimal path; on this see Aaheim and Nyborg (1995) and Neumayer (1999). 
What this paper has shown, in any case, is that even if these further complica-
tions are neglected, the World Bank (1997a) study does not provide a reliable 
measure of unsustainability and is therefore likely to lead to wrong policy con-
clusions. 
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Table 1. Share of single natural resources of total resource rents. 
 
Country 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 
   
Share of Oil and Natural Gas of Rents in %   
Algeria 96.32 98.85 99.54 99.35 99.35 
Bolivia 53.52 64.08 81.33 72.58 68.15 
Congo 90.34 97.49 99.49 99.58 100.00 
Ecuador 97.94 99.92 99.79 98.01 98.91 
Gabon 99.76 99.99 99.99 99.92 99.99 
Iran 99.71 99.76 99.74 98.81 99.23 
Nigeria 99.77 99.59 99.93 98.27 95.17 
Saudi Arabia 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Trinidad and Tobago 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Venezuela 94.10 97.81 98.94 97.69 96.94 
      
Share of Copper of Rents in %    
Papua New Guinea 55.18 81.84 61.42 59.09 48.29 
Zambia 96.50 91.29 81.15 80.18 81.45 
      
Share of Bauxite of Rents in %    
Jamaica 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
      
Share of Forestry of Rents in %    
Nepal 98.92 81.48 85.02 99.45 100.00 
Haiti 80.09 80.44 92.27 100.00 100.00 
Ghana 0.00 9.34 39.72 69.25 75.80 
      
Share of Gold of Rents in %      
Ghana 79.64 55.95 48.97 26.91 20.65 
Papua New Guinea 43.09 17.38 37.20 40.20 31.16 
      
Share of Iron Ore of Rents in %    
Mauritania 91.93 97.19 100.00 100.00 100.00 
      
Share of Tin of Rents in %      
Bolivia 29.00 27.98 12.81 5.06 8.06 
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Appendix 1: Frequency of Negative Extended Genuine Saving II Rates 
 
Out of 25 possible years, the following countries had negative EGS II rates for 
 
0 years: 45 countries in total: All high income countries, plus Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, 
Belice, Brazil, Burkina Faso, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Gre-
nada, India, Israel, Malaysia, Morocco, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, 
Turkey 
 
1-3 years: 13 countries in total: Argentina, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Kenya, Mali, Mauri-
tius, Pakistan, Paraguay, Togo, Tunisia, Uruguay, Zimbabwe 
 
4-6 years: 8 countries in total: Cameroon, Egypt, El Salvador, Indonesia, Mexico, Myanmar, 
Namibia, Peru 
 
7-10 years: 13 countries in total: Bahrain, Benin, Central African Republic, Chile, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Gambia, Guatemala, Guinea, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Suriname, Syria 
 
> 10 years: 24 countries in total: Algeria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burundi, Chad, Congo, Ecuador, 
Gabon, Ghana, Haiti, Iran, Jamaica, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Nepal, Nige-
ria, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia 
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Appendix 2: Sources of Data for Computing User Costs according to 
   the ‘El Serafy’-method 
 
To compute user costs for resource depletion according to the ‘El Serafy’-method, one needs to 
establish four different terms: 
 
• P-AC, net resource price 
• R, resource depletion (production) 
• r, the discount rate 
• n, the number of years reserves would last at current production rates (reserves to produc-
tion ratio). 
 
(P-AC) was computed by dividing resource rents in World Bank (1997a) through produc-
tion. If not stated otherwise in the text, the discount rate was assumed to be 4% p.a. This is the 
rate World Bank (1997a) uses for wealth estimations (for a justification see Kunte et al. 1997, p. 
8f.). 
 
Oil 
Production figures covering the period 1970-1994 came from British Petroleum (1980, 1986, 
1997) with the exception of Bolivia and Congo. For Congo production data for 1970-1979 came 
from Petroleum Publishing (various years) and from British Petroleum (1986, 1997) for 1980-
1994. For Bolivia production for 1970-1994 was taken from Financial Times Oil and Gas (various 
years). 
With the exception of Bolivia, Congo, and Trinidad and Tobago proven reserves were taken 
from OPEC (1979) for the years 1970-1979 and from OPEC (1997) for the years 1980-1994. For 
Bolivia, Congo, and Trinidad and Tobago reserves were taken from Energy Information Ad-
ministration (1991) for the years 1970-1991 and from Petroleum Publishing (various years) for 
1992-1994. 
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Natural Gas 
Production data covering the period 1970-1994 came from OPEC (various years) with the excep-
tion of Congo, Ecuador and Gabon. For Ecuador production data for 1991-1994, for Gabon pro-
duction data for 1971-1973 and for Congo production data for the period 1970-1994 came from 
United Nations Yearbook (various years). For 1970-1990 production data for Ecuador and for 
1974-1994 production data for Gabon came from OPEC (various years). 
With the exception of Bolivia and Congo proven reserves were taken from OPEC (1980) for 
1971-1979 and from OPEC (1997) for the years 1980-1994. For Bolivia and Congo proven re-
serves for the period 1970-1994 were taken from Petroleum Publishing (various years). 
 
Non-energy resources 
For bauxite, copper, gold and tin production data for 1981-1994 came from World Bureau of 
Metal Statistics (1991, 1997). For bauxite, copper and tin data for 1970-1980 came from World 
Bureau of Metal Statistics (1975, 1979, 1984). For gold data for 1970-1980 came from Financial 
Times Mining (various years). For 1970-1994 iron ore production data came from United Na-
tions (1977, 1986, 1996). 
Time-series individual country data for proven reserves of non-energy resources are notori-
ously difficult to get hold of. A couple of short-cut formulas had to be applied therefore where 
direct data were not available. The bias in the data is likely to be small, however, since accord-
ing to Bill Kirk from the U.S. Bureau of Mines non-energy reserves tend to be relatively constant 
over time. 
Bauxite reserve data for Jamaica came from U.S. Bureau of Mines (various years) with the 
help of the Bureau’s bauxite specialist Pat Plunkert. Copper reserve data for Zambia came from 
U.S. Bureau of Mines (various years). For Papua New Guinea individual country reserve data 
for copper could only be established for the years 1978-1981 and 1990. For 1976-1977 reserve 
data were approximated by world reserves in these years times the 1978 share of the country’s 
reserves of world reserves. The same applies to 1982-1986 using the 1981 share and to 1987-1989 
and 1991-1994 using the 1990 share. Individual gold reserve data for Ghana and Papua New 
Guinea could not be established. For Ghana gold reserves for 1970-1994 were approximated by 
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world reserves in these years times the 1994 share of the country’s reserves of world reserves 
which was provided by George J. Coackley, the U.S. Bureau of Mines’ country expert for Ghana. 
For Papua New Guinea it had to be assumed, somewhat arbitrarily, that her reserve share of 
world gold reserves for the years 1976-1994 were equal to her production share of world gold 
production in the corresponding years. Iron ore reserve data for Mauritania are due to personal 
information from Bill Kirk from the U.S. Bureau of Mines. Tin reserve data for Bolivia for 1978-
1994 came from Mineral Commodity Summaries (various years). For 1970-1977 reserve data 
were approximated by world reserves in these years times the 1978 share of the country’s re-
serves of world reserves. Where necessary, world reserves were taken from Mineral Commodity 
Summaries (various years). 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 The term ‘genuine’ was introduced by Hamilton (1994) to distinguish it from traditional net 
saving measures which included only depreciation of man-made capital. Strictly speaking, it is 
misleading, if not simply wrong, to define sustainability in terms of savings. What matters for 
sustainability is investment not saving, and saving is equal to investment only for the special 
case where there are no government expenditures. If there are government expenditures and 
no taxes, then saving equals investment plus government expenditures; or, more realistically, 
if there are taxes as well, saving plus taxes equal investment plus government expenditures. 
Usually, genuine saving is derived from dynamic optimisation models that do not include 
government expenditures. For these models saving equals investment and so I will speak of 
genuine saving rather than genuine investment in the remainder of the paper as well. 
2 All values are in current US$. For more information on the data see World Bank (1997a) and 
Kunte et al. (1997), its technical documentation. 
3 Kirk Hamilton from the Bank’s Environment Department is one of the main authors of World 
Bank (1997a). 
4 In the following saving rates are always defined as saving divided by GNP. 
5 Note that for the saving rates of all income groups and of all regional groups, countries enter 
the numerator with their savings and the denominator with their GNP, i.e. big countries tend 
to dominate the aggregate figures. 
6 The same reasoning applies to renewable resources if harvesting exceeds natural regeneration. 
7 By assumption, RC accrue at the beginning of the accounting period. If RC accrue at the end of 
the accounting period, then n+1 in equation (5) would be replaced by n. 
8 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing my attention on this point. 
9 Over the period 1970-1994, the approximate average oil reserves to production ratios are as 
follows: Congo 27 years, Ecuador 21 years, Gabon 17 years, Nigeria 27 years, Trinidad and 
Tobago 9 years. Mauritania’s average iron ore reserves to production ratio is 34 years. 
10 Congo > 100 years, Ecuador > 100 years, Nigeria > 80 years, Trinidad and Tobago > 70 years. 
Extremely high reserves to production ratios in years of unusually low production have been 
excluded in calculating the average in order to provide a conservative estimate. 
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11 Unfortunately, their natural gas reserves are smaller in terms of share of world reserves than 
their oil reserves: Congo has an average share of world natural gas reserves over the period of 
1970-1994 of about 0.05% as opposed to about 0.1% share of world oil reserves; the analogous 
figures for Ecuador are 0.12% as opposed to 0.3%; 0.07% as opposed to 0.17% for Gabon; 
1.87% as opposed to 2.35% for Nigeria. Only Trinidad and Tobago has higher natural gas than 
oil reserves (0.31% versus 0.11%). 
12 Note that the EGS II-rate (El Serafy) calculates resource rents according to the ‘El Serafy’-
method only for six out of a total of 30 countries. The rest enters the EGS II-rate (El Serafy) 
with their resource rents still computed according to the World Bank method. If resource rents 
for the other 24 countries had also been calculated according to the ‘El Serafy’-method (espe-
cially for such important resource producers as Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa) then, no 
doubt, the EGS II-rate (El Serafy) would have been positive throughout the period. 
13 It is unclear whether conditionality is supposed to apply to existing development aid or addi-
tional aid. Usually, the mentioned authors simply speak of aid in general, but Atkinson et al. 
(1997, p. 207) propose „a possible role for additional bilateral aid in assisting, where needed, 
the fulfilment of genuine savings requirements“ (my emphasis). 
